Louisiana oil spill making me homesick for Alaska

I'm in New Orleans, where the Deepwater Horizon oil well continues to spew oil into the Gulf of Mexico, and thinking about home in Alaska, where we fear a similar disaster awaits the Trans-Alaska.

The purpose of this post is to turn you on to an online petition, supporting a Citizens Advisory Council for the existing Trans-Alaska Pipeline. It's a great, proactive cause led by local fishermen and natives, that would allow locals to help keep the oil in the pipe. Failure here could mean a pipeline breach, disaster downstream in the Sag, Yukon or Copper River watersheds, and or loss of Alaska's entire supply of arctic crude. We need your help to put pressure on some apathetic congresscritters.

SIGN THE PETITION HERE

Back to the unfolding disaster in Louisiana. They say 1,000 bbls a day is spewing into the gulf. That sounds an awfully neat round number to me. (Anyone know how you estimate spill rate at 5,000 underwater with a remote control submarine?) In any event, a lot of oil. The best coverage is at Skytruth's blog, which posted the picture I used here, showing 2,233 square miles of slick and estimates 6 million gallons spilled so far. For the rosier party line, there's some good stuff at the official incident website.

The Deepwater Horizon's trouble with the undersea leak underscores a huge gap in spill preparedness— underwater oil. I studied up on the topic because we face the same problem in Alaska, where the glacial rivers are turbid and loaded with silt, so that any spilled oil would quickly become mixed in the water column, bind with silt, and sink.

The upshot is, there's jack you can do to deal with oil that is underwater. Can't tell where it's going or how much of it there is, let alone capture or recover it. Responders can, if they battle mightily and are lucky, sometimes protect valuable shorelines from surface slicks of oil. Subsurface oil? Forget it. Industry shrugs, the bureaucrats eye research grant opportunities, the regulators turn away.

I just hope the Deepwater Horizon doesn't go the way of the spill late last year off of Australia. (Skytruth submitted great testimony on that high-tech failure, posted here). That one went for ten weeks before a relief well could stop the flow. They're saying two to four weeks now to stop this leak. Godspeed.

Alaska Risk Assessment derails

Sarah Palin's "Alaska Risk Assessment," which once held promise of reforming oversight of Alaska's crumbling oilfield infrastructure, is in a death spiral. Watchdogs who've been following it are now calling on the State to hit the eject button. 

This conclusion was reached reluctantly after several of us attended a day-long workshop, May 5 in Anchorage, held by project contractors Doyon/Emerald and ABS consulting. The workshop presented the draft methodology for conducting the risk assessment. The document is available for review, and public comments are being accepted through June 2. 

What Palin announced way back in 2007 was a "comprehensive assessment of Alaska's Oil and Gas Infrastructure." Great! But like the Sarah we once knew and loved, the ARA has transformed into something very different. 

First of all, the study is not even remotely comprehensive. With fancy logic puzzles they put on an elaborate set of blinders. Here is a partial list of the aspects of risk being totally excluded from the ARA:

• Process Safety (e.g. corporate cost cutting, cheating, not following procedures)
• Marine transportation 
• 3rd party damage (terrorism, sabotage, maintenance damage)
• Abandoned facilities
• Facilities not yet in operation
• Refineries
• Gas distribution lines
• Government oversight (or, lack thereof)
• Maintenance
• Management of Change

Having cut out MOST of the risks we face, they continue putting on blinders. Further screening criteria filter out "insignificant," or "acceptable," risks. Among the things they consider not worth their bother:

• Any safety risk that would kill fewer than five workers in an explosion
• Reliability of Cook Inlet infrastructure
• "indirect" impacts of spills, such as to the fishing industry or subsistence
• Health impacts (ie. from toxic exposure to the public)
• Spills less than 10 bbl

Risks thus screened out will be assigned a "zero" ranking in the final risk profile. So, for example, if the ARA team discovers, even as a certainty, that  some risk—a corroded pipeline, say— was likely to kill four oilfield workers and shut down Cook Inlet oil & gas production forever, that will be considered "insignificant" and given a "zero" risk ranking. Poof. 

Not that they're likely to discover anything. The project was pitched as "an engineering analysis involving a thorough, independent appraisal of the condition of the state's oil and gas facilities." (Palin 2007 Press Release) 

What has emerged is nothing of the sort. Take the claim of, "independent." The contract was awarded to Doyon/Emerald. Doyon has millions in oilfield contracts— about $25 million in annual contracts with Alyeska alone. (Source: ExxonMobil Pipeline Company 2007/Q4 FERC Form No.6/6-Q) Doyon also hopes to start controversial drilling in the Yukon flats. They are independent? 

Alaska pioneer Walt Park, Governor Hammond's technical advisor during TAPS construction and Alaska's first Commissioner of Transportation, filed an official protest of Doyon's contract because of the conflict of interest. Parker's protest was dismissed by the State, but his point is being validated by what is happening. 

The methodology involves no fieldwork, no inspections, no verification of any sort. They will ask the oil industry to share their own appraisals of their facilities, and report back whatever they're given as fact, without doing any validation. How can they discover problems if they don't look for them?

You'd think the chance to present their own side of the story as undisputed fact would be enough for the oil industry. You'd be wrong. Industry has provided essentially no information, and there's no sign they will. Industry provided no comments whatever on the methodology. They've shared nothing regarding their own risk management procedures. Assuming they have any. Industry cites bogus concerns about trade secrets and proprietary data, but it's clear they are sabotaging Palin's effort. Without an independent contractor to shake loose some real facts, the State's effort it sunk.

It gets worse. When it was announced, Palin's press release said the study would "identify facilities and systems that pose the greatest risk of failure, along with measures to reduce risk." 

But Doyon/Emerald has backed off of making any recommendations. They are especially concerned not to recommend any increase in regulation or oversight. This is apparently based on industry pressure.  (See followup  comments of Richard Fineberg for documentation of this)

So, the ARA is not comprehensive, it is not an assessment, and it will not result in any recommendations for change. We're paying $5 million to get an incomplete photocopy of part of industry's own appraisal of itself and put it on a musty shelf.

The only part of the original mandate they seem to be fulfilling is to spend the alloted $5 million. 

National Academy of Sciences is peer reviewing the methodology concurrent with the public review. Doing my best impression of The Eternal Optimist, I'm hopeful this group will put the hammer down. They're extremely smart people with lots of professional pride, and signs so far are of a rigorous process. But then, on the committee for NAS are Richard Rabinow, who made a 34-year career with Exxon and held a high-ranking corporate positions on TAPS in 1994-1995, and Shirish Patil, who does research for industry at University of Alaska, Fairbanks.  Again, smart and professional. But how long do technocrats expect us regular idiots—who just live on the rivers, work in the oilfields, and clean up their spills— to ignore our own common sense and just trust them? Especially when all we see is paper flying, nothing changing, and oil spilling?

Given the methodology now proposed, the only possible purpose the ARA will serve is as a whitewash for industry and overseers to remain complacent with regard to oil spills. In this, ARA today is a complete transformation from its original, stated purpose. 

The best way out now for the State is to cancel the contract with DoyonEmeral/ABS, invest the remaining funds in an oilfield ombudsman program, and support creation of a TAPS Citizens Advisory Council. There's a sign-on letter circulating that should draw broad support. Contact Betsy at Alaska Wilderness League (betsy@alaskawild.org), or me at Cascadia Wildlands Alaska Field Office, or  if you or your group would like to sign on. Or, submit your own comments by June 2.

When it comes to preventing spills and accidents, we're all in this together, and complacency is our worst enemy.

—GWS 

Cordova, AK

/Cascadia Wildlands ARA comments.pdf

Documents raise questions about TAPS corrosion

When asked about corrosion on the Trans-Alaska Pipeline (TAPS), the response from Alyeska and regulators is generally, "no problem." However, documents we just obtained through FOIA from the U.S. Office of Pipeline Safety raise key questions about corrosion on the Trans-Alaska Pipeline.

1. Is Corrosion an Issue on the TAPS?

The nice thing about internal FOIA documents is they aren't polished for public consumption, and they say what they mean. One inspector writes, in a violation report filed for a June 18-21, 2007 inspection, "Alyeska does not have procedures to address internal corrosion. Alyeska asserts that the TAPS pipeline does not have internal corrosion. Pig records (2001, UT and MFL, 2004) indicate that there is internal corrosion on TAPS."

The full truth is complicated (industry seems to like things complicated). Alyeska answers this allegation directly, writing: "the rate of internal corrosion present in TAPS has been extremely low and non-injurious as shown by the minimal internal corrosion present in TAPS durign the first 31 years of operation. These low corrosion rates are the result of very low amounts of produced water (typicaly less than 0.45% BS&W) within the crude oil but more importantly, a very proactive cleaning pig program... ILI [smart pig] data supports the effectiveness of this program." Alyeska also indicates large jumps in the amount of corrosion chemical inhibitor injected, from 16,861 gallons in 2005, to 25,299 gallons in 2007. (Source: Alyeska's May 22, 2008 answer to NOPV CPF 5-2008-5008, finding 6 p.2) 

So, corrosion is an issue on the TAPS, but Alyeska claims they are all over it. This raises a second question.

2. Is Alyeska's corrosion program on top of it?

Alyeska is generally regarded as setting the industry standard on corrosion control. But evidence to back that up is becoming thin.  In 2008 alone, Alyeska was cited for 13 regulatory violations with regard to corrosion on TAPS. The pattern that emerges is of Alyeska systematically downplaying risks and cutting corners.

Some violations find the company legally guilty of "bad faith," for example in cutting back on monitoring for corrosion-related conditions at pipeline road crossings. (CPF# 5-2008-5008 violation report) 

Also, "Alyeska does not monitor atmospheric corrosion on TAPS on a three year cycle. Alyeska asserts that the TAPS pipeline does not have atmospheric corrosion, because the above ground pipe is insulated." (CPF 5-2008-5008 violation report)

Others point to dangerous sections of line. There is trouble with the Greater Prudhoe Bay transit line, on the North Slope between BP's Skid 50 facility and Pump Station 1. This short pipeline is very similar to the  feeder pipelines that spilled in March and August 2006 due to extensive corrosion.  But while the feeder lines are being replaced, "the Affected Pipeline has never been cleaned or internally inspected since it was constructed roughly thirty yeas ago." (CPF 5-2008-5016H Notice of Proposed Corrective Action Order.) 

Part of the trouble on the Slope seems to be inability of oil companies to work other. BP had initially planned to replace the GPB line, but suspended the operation "because it had not been able to obtain funding approval from all of the Owners." Alyeska's current plan is to perhaps replace the pipeline during summer, 2009. 

Another dangerous area is Thompson Pass, where OPS critisizes Alyeska for slow response to pipeline damage from the October, 2006 flood.  Of six locations Alyeska identified with possible flood-related damage, over a year later they had only investigated one. 

And, at that one inspection, Alyeska actually had found damage to the mainline pipe. Pictures of milepost 761.7 show how the flood washed out the pipeline, tearing holes in the protective tape and washing sand and silt underneath. Alyeska's inspection report by their corrosion engineer indicates overburden was washed away from the pipe and replaced with 3-ft boulders. Despite finding this damage, Alyeska did not fix it. Alyeska was scheduled to investigate and repair the damaged locations in summer, 2008. 

3. How close to the edge of failure does Alyeska operate?

It boils down to a risk assessment. What is the risk of a spill and how bad would it be, versus what would be the cost to prevent it? This risk assessment is exactly what the State should be doing with the ARA project, but aren't. Part of the barrier for the State team is that Alyeska isn't sharing their information with them, either. 

One of the FOIA documents is Alyeska's Risk Assessment section of their Integrity Management Plan, dated November 27, 2007. It is just a summary, not the actual assessment, but it has some interesting numbers.  It concludes that "overall risk of a leak exceeding 50 barrels on TAPS in the next 28 years is 0.26 per year, or once every 4 years." (p.5-29) They reference another (secret) report which "identifies pipeline segments determined to affect HCAs [High Consequence Areas on] (approximately 30% of TAPS)." (p.5-30)

It lists 135 "active corrosion site[s]"  considered as risk inputs, (p.5-22) but doesn't explain how corrosion is calculated to increase risks. In the 2005 Risk Analysis (the DNV Study) their hired experts dramatically changed their judgement of the relative risk of corrosion, meaning they now take corrosion less seriously than they used to. (Source: DNV Screening Risk Assessment, May 6, 2005, pp.16-18)

The other part of risk assessment is how heavily you weigh the cost of a spill to one of these areas. Alyeska's record on this is abysmal. They only consider their own costs, taking free risks with downstream stakeholders. Their judgement of what is valuable is different from yours or mine. Copper River residents have been shocked to learn that our world-famous river is not considered an Environmentally Sensitive Area under regulation, for example.

The oil company cost to spill is not very high, so they feel free to take risks. It is often cheaper for them to let equipment fail than to maintain it. Cheaper for them. 

In sum, this latest batch of documents shows a pattern of Alyeska downplaying risks of corrosion, which, despite glossy assurances, is a major issue on TAPS. Corrosion management is taking place behind closed doors, and stakeholders lack assurance that our interests are being protected.

Workshop on Citizen Oversight of Alaska Pipeline

Downstream stakeholders are cordially invited to a Trans-Alaska Pipeline Citizen Oversight Workshop, March 10- 11, at the Valdez Civic Center.

Cascadia Wildlands Project’s Alaska field office, and Copper River Watershed Project, are hosting the consensus-building workshop that will involve subsistence, sport and commercial fishermen, conservationists, tribes, ANCSA Corporations, business-owners, and other downstream residents

Our mission as citizens, twenty years after the Exxon Valdez, is to work together on proactive measures to ensure that never again will such a disaster take place. While improvements have been made in Prince William Sound since the spill, the complacency in government and industry has again creeped in, especially on the TAPS.

As citizens, there are two key things we all have in common:

1. we want to keep the oil in the pipe;

2. we aren’t willing to just cross our fingers and hope.

The Goal of the Meeting is to reach consensus on priorities for improved safety of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, and initiate a plan of action to make that happen. Informal discussions among stakeholders have focused on a Citizen Oversight Council, similar to the one in Prince William Sound that was formed as a demonstration project after the Exxon Valdez. At that time, Congress found that similar Citizen Oversight Councils should be formed elsewhere as well. This promise has never been met.

If we are the change we've been waiting for, lets step up and make it happen. Hope to see you in Valdez!

Download Meeting Materials Here:

>Meeting Invite & Agenda

>Press Advisory

Background on Citizen Oversight:

> Fineberg Research (the most comprehensive, reliable source of information on the TAPS)

> Copper River Sensitive Area Map

>Copper River Watershed Project White Paper on Citizen Oversight

>Comparison Table on Citizen Oversight Models

>Predicted Impacts of a TAPS spill to Copper River

>PWS RCAC White Paper on Citizen Oversight

>Cordova District Fishermen United Resolution in support of TAPS RCAC

>Models of Public Oversight of Government & Industry, by Rick Steiner

>Citizen Challenge to TAPS Contingency Plan

Oil Industry Won't Play Along With Palin Risk Study

The oil industry is refusing to cooperate with Palin’s Alaska Risk Assessment, according to project managers and documents. This is an arrogant and troubling stance that puts Alaska’s landmark risk study on the brink of failing before it even gets started. 

A little background. The Alaska Risk Assessment is Sarah Palin’s answer to the rash of corrosion-caused oil spills and the 2006 Prudhoe Bay shutdown. Frank Murkowski had quickly put in place a new agency that would regulate the oilfield. Palin stepped back from the regulatory stance, and initiated a cooperative, scientific venture instead. It is premised on a comprehensive survey of oilfield infrastructure, gathering input of all stakeholders, analyzing that data objectively, then churning out hard numbers of risks to guide future decisions.

You might have thought industry would appreciate the favor of being freed from actual regulations. Having seen the slick oil company ads, you might have thought they’d be anxious to brag about their accomplishments, show everybody just how careful they really are.

You would be wrong. While other stakeholders stepped up to the plate and offered input, industry has refused to play along. The comment deadline came and went, with not a breath of industry feedback. Today they remain locked in argument over obscure points about “trade secrets” and “confidential” information. I suspect oil company lawyers are racking up the billable hours, but even giving them the benefit of the doubt, those legal concerns couldn’t possibly explain the lack of any input.

I see a couple possible explanations for this behavior.

First, maybe industry’s traditional secrecy takes over even when there is no rational reason. Habit trumps thinking. If Exxon asked BP what time it was, they’d have to first run the response through an army of lawyers. This stance does not serve industry’s interests, only their lawyers'. 

A second, more sinister, explanation is that industry is deliberately sabotaging the Palin effort. Without industry cooperation, the risk study fails. The State would then be forced to either give up, or enact stricter laws and regulations requiring industry to share what they know. This kind of bullying has worked for them before.

Whatever the reason, the result is bad for all of us. Infrastructure continues to corrode, trust among stakeholders continues to erode, the State continues to waste money, and oil companies spend their efforts on lawyers, not engineers.

The lesson in all this, it seems to me, is that voluntary cooperation and self-regulation doesn’t work because the oil industry is not a good-faith partner. They just aren't good neighbors. They only do what they HAVE to, not a bit more. Effective management of Alaska's oil infrastructure, then, requires stringent regulation, with strong penalties for non-compliance.

No more Mr. Nice Guy.

Hawkins Island Subdivision Christmas Tale

Proving that grassroots community activism really can make a difference, the Alaska DNR is tentatively calling off its planned 30-parcel subdivision in Shipyard Bay, on Hawkins Island in Prince William Sound. 

It all started in late November, when the State put out a public notice on a preliminary decision to auction off some 300 acres in Shipyard and Deep Bays, just across the water from Cordova in one of the town's favorite deer hunting spots. Not just conservationists, but real-estate brokers and the village ANCSA corporation raised alarms. The state said the subdivision was necessary for "community expansion," but that just made no sense. What about all the empty subdivisions already right in town? Only three people live on Hawkins Island now, and they were all dead set against it. What was really going on here?

Hearing that town was united to opposition, Cascadia called a community meeting to strategize how to kill the proposal. Locals, hunters, landowners, real estate brokers, the local wildlife biologist, the mayor, media and others gathered in the Union Hall building on Main Street to put the pieces together and figure out what to do.

We got a pleasant surprise when the DNR official in charge, Jason Walsh, came down from Anchorage to attend our meeting. He opened with a background of where the project came from. The project is based on a "settlement" designation in the Prince William Sound Area Plan, a document written in 1988. Nobody in the community could remember where the idea had come from. Walsh said he had looked, but couldn't find anything about it in the project file. 

So there's your conspiracy. Bureaucratic inertia.

Knowing that his proposal was based on an outdated plan, Walsh said he'd been carefully considering the wave of comments he was getting from locals. "You can sit at my computer and just watch the emails coming in," he said. Almost all urged him to drop the proposal. These weren't shallow comments either, he said. Most were based on long-term, intimate knowledge of the place. Deer hunting. Duck hunting. Clam digging. Mushroom gathering. Kayaking. Just exploring.

Then he dropped his bombshell. Walsh surprised almost everyone present when he then said that, based on these factors, so far he was leaning towards dropping the subdivision plan for Shipyard Bay. "A settlement designation is not appropriate for Shipyard Bay," he said, adding that "Public Recreation, and Habitat" would fit what he's heard so far. He urged people to tell him more about what the 3,000 acres of State land should be used for. 

To resolve the issue the Prince William Sound Area Plan needs to be amended. It's long overdue anyway. There are supposed to be annual performance checks, and full reviews of the plan every five years, but none have been done since 1988 when the plan was signed. 

Then came the catch. "I only can write decisions to sell land," he said. "I can't write decisions not to sell land." The planning people are in a different DNR division, it turns out, and they're beyond swamped. The State has five staff doing planning for the entire state, with massive issues in places like Mat-Su, Bristol Bay, and the Arctic. It will be at least five years before Prince William Sound gets any attention.

So, what can we do? The public comment period is open through February 2, 2009. Walsh urged everyone to use those comments to express what they want for the entire 3,000 acres of State land on Hawkins Island, especially Deep Bay, where he is still considering selling some lots. He can pass those comments on to the planning people. 

I'll go a step further and urge folks to use their comments to urge the State to update the Prince William Sound Area Plan, as they're required to do. What made sense in the heyday flush of 1988 Prince William Sound, doesn't make sense after the realities of the Exxon Valdez, collapsed fisheries, advent of cruise ships, and opening the Whittier Tunnel. 

Outdated Area Plans are a problem all over Alaska, so folks should also contact their elected representatives and tell them to stop starving the planning arm of DNR. 

The Constitutional Natural Resources policy depends on balance. Article VIII of the Alaska Constitution sets state policy that resources must be made available for "maximum use consistent with the public interest." Section 2 then demands the legislature "shall provide for the utilization, development, and conservation of all natural resources belonging to the State, including land and waters, for the maximum benefit of its people."  

State bureaucrats and politicians have been seeing only the "maximum use," part of that, not the equally important, "maximum benefit of the people." 

Well, there is at least one DNR bureaucrat who was listening to the people. I heard several quip that Mr. Walsh's reversal on the subdivision was the first time they'd ever known of their comment to a government agency actually being listened to.

Now, Governor, Legislators, lets catch some Holiday magic and get these planning guys some support, eh? 

Comment to: Jason Walsh, DNR/DMLW Land Sales Unit

 Jason.Walsh@alaska.gov 

For More Information: /Download%20Factsheet%20Here

Documents Show Corroding Alaska Pipeline

Corrosion is eating away at approximately 319 significant pits in the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, according to Alyeska pig run data obtained through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The pig run data shows that corrosion is both severe, with as much as 47% wall thickness already gone in some locations, and widespread, being clustered in locations all up and down the line. [Ed Note, 3/29/09: recent, reliable third hand information is that Alyeska dug up this particular section this summer, and found the smart pig was inaccurate, and there was only 33% wall loss. I'm told their fix criteria is roundabouts 40% wall loss, so they plan to take action on it some time later.] Correspondence also released with the pig run results shows that, of the 319 rusting locations, Alyeska has scheduled only six for repair or special inspection on their three-year dig scope.

Corroded locations include:

• 29 pits in the Copper River Watershed, including one with 47% wall loss, along the Gulkana River;
• 16 pits along the Lowe River, including two in Keystone Canyon where maximum operating pressure exceeds the calculated "B31G" remaining strength;
• 19 pits along the Delta River;
• 7 pits within the town of Delta Junction;
• 7 pits in North Pole;
• 3 pits in Fairbanks;
• 4 pits in the Yukon River High Consequence Area;
• 18 pits where leaks would quickly drain to the Koyukuk River;
• 56 pits along the Sagavanirktok River, which threatens release into the Arctic Ocean.

This corrosion is a major danger to downstream stakeholders. A spill at one of these locations could spell disaster, particularly around stream crossings. Expect any corroded holes to leak for a long time before being detected, too. Alyeska estimates it would take them 3 months to detect a "small" leak in a buried pipeline section, such as those along the Gulkana, Sagavanirktok and Delta rivers.

The rusted TAPS is also a threat to consumers and the economy. The 2006 corrosion-caused shutdown sent shockwaves through markets and led to a gasoline price spike. An extended TAPS shutdown during winter could turn the pipeline into one long, crude-oil popsicle. Alyeska has no real cold restart procedure.

The list of "anomolies" are the long-awaited results of Alyeska's most recent "ILI-MFL" smart pig run. Generally run every three years, these smart pigs are the key method of checking TAPS for internal corrosion. The results show size and location of rusted spots and amount of wall loss. Calculations are then run that show the remaining "B31G" hoop strength, giving a conservative estimate of maximum operating pressure before the pipe would burst. The tool is not terribly precise, being specified to +/- 10%, 80% of the time.

These pig runs lately have been plagued with problems. The first attempt in 2006 failed on the southern part of the line, for undisclosed reasons. Around the same time, the huge metal O-ring in a cleaning pig was lost somewhere in the pipe. The smart pig was run again in 2007. The combined results are what is shown in the FOIA.

Additional correspondence released in this FOIA shows an inefficient bureaucracy and noncooperative industry. Alyeska repeatedly delays release of smart pig results, citing complications with subcontractors, BJ Process & Pipeline Service Company, and CC Technologies.

Federal regulators at Joint Pipeline Office show no evidence of being in control. Their directives are routinely ignored and violated by Alyeska, with no repercussions. There is only one lonesome inspection report in the file, and that is on a peripheral issue.

I want to say they are asleep at the wheel. But after reviewing the weak pipeline regulations in play, it may be a more apt metaphor to say they're stuck behind the wheel of one of those little clown cars, trying to influence the industry, who drives a Hummer.

There is more to come. These documents are only a first installment. Alyeska has filed a "reverse FOIA" seeking to block release of two related studies that should help explain the significance of the pig results. It looks like we may have to take them to court to see those.

Download the FOIA Here:

/Alyeska_pig_run_results.pdf

Whistleblower calls out Bush Justice Department for letting BP off easy

EPA whistle-blower Scott West came forward yesterday charging that criminal prosecution of BP for the North Slope's largest-ever oil spill in 2006 was illegally blunted by Bush administration political appointees. The $20 million misdemeanor fine that was issued is far lower than the EPA's recommended fine of between $58 and $672 million. Also, investigation into felonies by BP executives was abruptly halted, before evidence had even been reviewed, and over objections of staff. (Download the /letter)

At root the case is about BP cutting corners by skimping on corrosion protection and control and leak detection systems. By cutting costs they increase profit. But, at the expense of more and bigger and worse spills and workplace injuries.

"The BP Alaska settlement is part of a pattern of "lowball" corporate public safety and pollution settlements engineered by the Bush Justice Department," West and Public Employees for Environmental Ethics said in a letter to the DOJ Inspector General asking for an investigation. "A $20 million fine is essentially a rounding error in terms of the money BP makes in Alaska. There is little deterrent value in this amount to encourage BP to change its ways..."

"The deterrence value of criminal fines is being systematically undermined by this DOJ," they write, pointing to"outrageous"  low-ball settlements in the Olympic Pipeline explosion, Selandang Ayu sinking, and BP Texas City explosion.

West's allegations certainly fit into some familiar patterns. Justice Department being run by political hacks, big corporations getting slaps on the wrist for dangerous behavior, and evidence of wrongdoing being covered up. Corrosion continues to eat away the oilfield, and spills continue to happen. The only real surprise here is that this time, someone from the inside came forward and is making a fuss about it. 

With the new administration we hope the Inspector General takes these allegations seriously. The whistle-blower writes that other senior managers can corroborate the allegations, "but they cannot openly talk at this time because their jobs would be in jeopardy." That in itself points to something wrong. Time to clean up your act, guys.

The bottom line in all this is that oil companies and regulators aren't doing their jobs. The results are evident in spill and explosions that continue to threaten Alaska's environment and workers, and the Nation's oil supply. Sweetheart deals are the almost inevitable result of doing things behind closed doors, and locking actual stakeholders out. Political appointees and corporate hacks are never going to do the right thing unless they are held accountable and their dealings are exposed to the light of day. 

The ultimate solution then are Regional Citizen Advisory Councils that give stakeholders a seat at the table. That's what was done here in Prince William Sound after the Exxon Valdez, and it has done wonders. Contact your representative and tell them we need to do this, and join the CWP to help us make them.

Alaska Risk Assessment on the right track

FAIRBANKS— Well they're sure taking their sweet time about it, but the State Risk Assessment of all our oil infrastructure seems to be moving in the right direction. If done right, the $4 million study will prove conclusively that Alaska's pipelines are in dire need of oversight, and show the benefits of a robust oversight and maintenance program.

The first public hearing on the project was last Thursday in Fairbanks. Industry and government people outnumbered the actual public three-to-one, but those who did show up brought an impressive breadth of knowledge. And among those whose job it was to attend were every member of the State Oversight Team, who are ultimately responsible for the recommendations at the end of the project, Senator Joe Thomas, Rep David Guttenberg, and Rep Scott Kawasaki. I've been to many public hearings and it is VERY rare for any actual decision-makers to be there listening. That they took the trouble here shows the State is taking public interest in the project seriously.

The best news to come out of Thursday's hearing was State project manager Ira Rosen's announcement that they are negotiating for a National Academy of Sciences peer review of the methodology. This is a great step that will help ensure the method and results are scientifically robust and objectively defensible. It is absolutely necessary too, because the project currently amounts to government and industry reviewing themselves alone. Both Doyon and the State live off of oil industry money. We're all Alaskans and I have growing faith they'll do a good job on this, but there is a clear conflict of interest. The NAS peer review will be the critical test.

To ensure at least some independent oversight of the actual implemenation phase of the project, they should fund and form a mini Citizen Advisory Council of Alaskan stakeholders for purposes of this study. The State could convene such a group to meet during project implementation and participate as a non-voting, advisory body during the critical decision phase. If  impacted communities, industries like tourism and fishing, interests like subsistence, and Alaska Native tribes are not in the room when decisions are made, it will be very hard to hold the end product up as any kind of independent review.

And whoever thought to leave ADF&G off the State Oversight Team wasn't thinking clearly. 

Also encouraging at the meeting was the strong role being played by the Department of Revenue. Deputy Commissioner Marsha Davis explained that Revenue was a "keenly interested agency," due to the threat to State revenues from accidents and spills. She also explained that the new ACES tax structure, being based on Net Profit, for the first time gives the state access to oil company figures for maintenance spending and unplanned disruptions due to accidents.

This is critical because the project relies on getting accurate information from oil companies, who are by habit not prone to share anything. Davis explained that if the industry tried to stonewall they'd "be their own worst enemy." The choice for industry really is whether to "do this the easy way, or the hard way." They can share the information voluntarily; or, force the State to enact further laws and regulations requiring it.

Probably the most intelligent comment of the evening came from Fairbanks citizen Ed Morgan, who gave everyone a quick lesson in "process safety." Recommended reading is the Baker report, which blamed process safety for BP's 2004 refinery explosion. Maintenance procedures don't mean anything if they're not actually done, for example. Human factors (like lack of training) can cause even physically perfect pipelines to fail. The key, he explained, is a work environment with good input feedback loops. 

Pam Miller of the Northern Alaska Environmental Center pointed out that access to oilfield workers was critical, given historic company hostility to Whistleblowers. The project team said they'll take anonymous comments on the web. (Go HERE to comment).  Several of us said that probably wasn't good enough, and offered suggestions for ways to reach workers on the patch. Anyone with information about risk factors on Alaska's oilfield would do all Alaskans a great public service by sharing their knowledge with this team. Use their comment form, and the State Project Contact is Ira Rosen: (907) 465-6219, ira.rosen@alaska.gov  

Richard Fineberg, who has written extensively on these topics, noted agreement with every single public commenters. Dave Lacey noted that the reality of Global Warming need to be considered, including changing permafrost.

A Regional Citizens Advisory Council for the TAPS was brought up as a point of strong agreement, as a potential solution to many of the biggest risks. Morgan, who happened to have run Alyeksa/SERVS for some years, offered that in his experience, without any doubt, the Prince William Sound RCAC has made Alyeska's operations there better and safer. He said it was "well worth the money they spent on it."

I hope many of you will attend the meetings or comment on their online form. 

For all the potential good of this project though, it sure is slow as molasses. They don't even plan to start actually DOING the study until after next summer. That is three years after the 2006 corrosion-caused spills and shutdown that showed something is broken that needs fixing. Meanwhile the Copper River sits exposed to the corroding pipeline, Big Oil is still cutting costs, and those of us downstream have no real voice in decisions. The ARA project is going in the right direction. I just hope they get where we're going before its too late.

Alaska Risk Assessment Off To Slow Start

Alaska's oil pipelines and other infrastructure are falling apart at the seams, risking catastrophe for downstream village residents, wilderness areas and wild salmon runs. 

So when Governor Sarah Palin announced the state would do a $4 million Risk Assessment evaluating Alaska's oil pipelines and infrastructure, we were among those who cheered the move. The fact-based study was Palin's response to the 2006 Prudhoe Bay corrosion-caused shutdowns. The above-board approach was a welcome relief to the Murkowski-era bureaucratic response to our badly managed, leak-prone and aging system of pipelines.

Over a year into the study though and progress is underwhelming. Bureaucracy is moving, money is being spent and people are doing things, but tangible results have been elusive. The study design ensures that important risks will be ignored. Public involvement seems more geared to winning consent of stakeholders than reforming pipeline oversight. Conflicts of interest of the company hired to do the study could also undercut credibility. Ideally public involvement and transparency can fix these problems, and project leaders assure us that this will be done. All in all though, rubber has not yet met the road.

The Risk Analysis, if done right, will be a comprehensive audit of oil infrastructure that identifies the highest-risk areas and recommends strong protective measures. This is a great opportunity for interests to be considered and weighed by objective standards, rather than just by oil company book-keepers and lawyers. 

What is at stake? Consider that an oil spill from the TAPS could easily escape into one of our great rivers. I know that the Copper River is nakedly exposed for over 170 miles of pipeline. The Yukon is also exposed. Or consider the emerging disaster in NPR-A, where villagers in Nuiqsut are getting sick while gas flares run. With pipelines composed of leaky valves, rusted pipe, and cracked seals, rooted in unstable permafrost, all being run by glitch-prone computers programmed by cost-cutting oil companies, the risks need a hard look.

The primary accomplishment to date though is granting a $4 million contract to a private company to do the study. The selection of a Doyon subsidiary raises eyebrows because they are a major contractor on thevery  pipelines and wells being evaluated. The conflict of interest is obvious. The state's press release touts the fact that Doyon is an Alaska company, showing shades of the cronyism and insider-dealing that has gotten previous administrations in trouble. 

On the other hand, Doyon does have a professional, experienced staff, and certainly has the where-with-all and know-how to tackle the technically complex tasks. There are good, smart people on the job, and it would be wonderful to see them prove the critics wrong. 

The biggest limitation of the study are the  blinders put on by the State's criteria excluding risks of security/ terrorism, and marine transportation. Yet past risk anlyses have found that marine transportation is the most dangerous link in the oil transportation chain, and that terrorism/sabotage is one of the most risky aspects of pipelines. Coincidentally, Doyon also holds security contracts on pipelines.

The public meeting schedule has just been released, and I encourage everyone to get involved. Subsistence hunters and fishers, users, commercial fishermen, Bush Alaskans, oilfield workers and wilderness lovers all have a big stake in this. If you can't make a public hearing, comments can be submitted on the project website. Stakeholder involvement is the indispensable remedy to the complacence and conflicts of interest inherent in the bureaucracy and corporation-run study. If we all work together, we can get this done right. Hearing Dates are:

September 25—Fairbanks

October 1—Kenai

October 15—Anchorage

October 16—Valdez

October 22—Barrow

Hope to see you there!