Trans-Alaska Pipeline crosses large tributaries to the Copper River (k ritley)
NO COPPER RIVER OIL SPILL
Some say Big Oil owns Alaska. Not quite: Cascadia Wildlands represents conservation interests against the giant oil companies who would drill to the ends of the earth.
We have had success against Goliath. In 2003 we killed the Katalla oil exploration project and won back over 65,000 acres of the Copper River Delta from oil leases to public conservation lands.
The current top threat to the famous Copper River salmon is the Trans-Alaska Pipeline (TAPS). The pipeline, which carries all of Alaska’s arctic crude oil, snakes for over 160 miles through the watershed. Due to corrosion, lax regulation, and severely misguided priorities, oil companies have left the river vulnerable to a catastrophic oil spill from the pipeline.
We are committed to holding oil companies accountable for identifying and protecting environmentally sensitive areas in the watershed. We are working closely with the Copper River Watershed Project and other affected communities on creating an independent Citizen's Oversight Council for the river. Diverse stakeholders working for oversight of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline recently created a coalition website to draw attention to the dire need for independent oversight. Be sure to sign the online petition to help create independent oversight of the pipeline.
background When asked about corrosion on the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, the response from Alyeska and regulators is generally, "no problem." However, documents we obtained through FOIA from the U.S. Office of Pipeline Safety raise key questions about corrosion on the Trans-Alaska Pipeline.
1. Is corrosion an issue on the TAPS? The nice thing about internal FOIA documents is they aren't polished for public consumption, and they say what they mean. One inspector writes, in a violation report filed for a June 18-21, 2007 inspection, "Alyeska does not have procedures to address internal corrosion. Alyeska asserts that the TAPS pipeline does not have internal corrosion. Pig records (2001, UT and MFL, 2004) indicate that there is internal corrosion on TAPS."
The full truth is complicated (industry seems to like things complicated). Alyeska answers this allegation directly, writing: "the rate of internal corrosion present in TAPS has been extremely low and non-injurious as shown by the minimal internal corrosion present in TAPS during the first 31 years of operation. These low corrosion rates are the result of very low amounts of produced water (typically less than 0.45% BS&W) within the crude oil but more importantly, a very proactive cleaning pig program... ILI [smart pig] data supports the effectiveness of this program." Alyeska also indicates large jumps in the amount of corrosion chemical inhibitor injected, from 16,861 gallons in 2005, to 25,299 gallons in 2007. (Source: Alyeska's May 22, 2008 answer to NOPV CPF 5-2008-5008, finding 6 p.2) \
So, corrosion is an issue on the TAPS, but Alyeska claims they are all over it. This raises a second question.
2. Is Alyeska's corrosion program on top of it? Alyeska is generally regarded as setting the industry standard on corrosion control. But evidence to back that up is becoming thin. In 2008 alone, Alyeska was cited for 13 regulatory violations with regard to corrosion on TAPS. The pattern that emerges is of Alyeska systematically downplaying risks and cutting corners.
Some violations find the company legally guilty of "bad faith," for example in cutting back on monitoring for corrosion-related conditions at pipeline road crossings. (CPF# 5-2008-5008 violation report) Also, "Alyeska does not monitor atmospheric corrosion on TAPS on a three year cycle. Alyeska asserts that the TAPS pipeline does not have atmospheric corrosion, because the above ground pipe is insulated." (CPF 5-2008-5008 violation report)
Others point to dangerous sections of line. There is trouble with the Greater Prudhoe Bay transit line, on the North Slope between BP's Skid 50 facility and Pump Station 1. This short pipeline is very similar to the feeder pipelines that spilled in March and August 2006 due to extensive corrosion. But while the feeder lines are being replaced, "the Affected Pipeline has never been cleaned or internally inspected since it was constructed roughly thirty yeas ago." (CPF 5-2008-5016H Notice of Proposed Corrective Action Order.)
Part of the trouble on the Slope seems to be inability of oil companies to work other. BP had initially planned to replace the GPB line, but suspended the operation "because it had not been able to obtain funding approval from all of the Owners." Alyeska's current plan is to perhaps replace the pipeline during summer, 2009.
Another dangerous area is Thompson Pass, where OPS criticizes Alyeska for slow response to pipeline damage from the October, 2006 flood. Of six locations Alyeska identified with possible flood-related damage, over a year later they had only investigated one.
And, at that one inspection, Alyeska actually had found damage to the mainline pipe. Pictures of milepost 761.7 show how the flood washed out the pipeline, tearing holes in the protective tape and washing sand and silt underneath. Alyeska's inspection report by their corrosion engineer indicates overburden was washed away from the pipe and replaced with 3-ft boulders. Despite finding this damage, Alyeska did not fix it. Alyeska was scheduled to investigate and repair the damaged locations in summer, 2008.
3. How close to the edge of failure does Alyeska operate? It boils down to a risk assessment. What is the risk of a spill and how bad would it be, versus what would be the cost to prevent it? This risk assessment is exactly what the State should be doing with the ARA project, but aren't. Part of the barrier for the State team is that Alyeska isn't sharing their information with them, either.
One of the FOIA documents is Alyeska's Risk Assessment section of their Integrity Management Plan, dated November 27, 2007. It is just a summary, not the actual assessment, but it has some interesting numbers. It concludes that "overall risk of a leak exceeding 50 barrels on TAPS in the next 28 years is 0.26 per year, or once every 4 years." (p.5-29) They reference another (secret) report which "identifies pipeline segments determined to affect HCAs [High Consequence Areas on] (approximately 30% of TAPS)." (p.5-30)
It lists 135 "active corrosion site[s]" considered as risk inputs, (p.5-22) but doesn't explain how corrosion is calculated to increase risks. In the 2005 Risk Analysis (the DNV Study) their hired experts dramatically changed their judgement of the relative risk of corrosion, meaning they now take corrosion less seriously than they used to. (Source: DNV Screening Risk Assessment, May 6, 2005, pp.16-18)
The other part of risk assessment is how heavily you weigh the cost of a spill to one of these areas. Alyeska's record on this is abysmal. They only consider their own costs, taking free risks with downstream stakeholders. Their judgement of what is valuable is different from yours or mine. Copper River residents have been shocked to learn that our world-famous river is not considered an Environmentally Sensitive Area under regulation, for example.
The oil company cost to spill is not very high, so they feel free to take risks. It is often cheaper for them to let equipment fail than to maintain it. Cheaper for them.
In sum, this latest batch of documents shows a pattern of Alyeska downplaying risks of corrosion, which, despite glossy assurances, is a major issue on TAPS. Corrosion management is taking place behind closed doors, and stakeholders lack assurance that our interests are being protected.
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This video shows exterior, visible corrosion along the pipeline. This corrosion, plus the interior corrosion pigs have recorded along the pipeline and grossly inadequate spill response plans, add up to significant risk of an oil spill.
